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In Europe, as elsewhere in the global North, the label ‘Made in China’ has become synonymous 
with low wages, excessive overtime and exploitative working conditions. Conventional literature 
on international division of labor reifies the North-South divide in particular with respect to class 
formation and labor agency. Contrasting of working conditions in China to those in Europe sets 
these up as opposite in their managerial practices and treatment of the workforce. This paper 
challenges such dualism and makes visible the commonalities of contemporary global capitalism. 
It does so by examining Foxconn’s production regimes in China and the Czech Republic and 
identifying a specific set of interventions on the part of the firm that enable its global 
organisation of production. In indicating which practices Foxconn imported from China and 
which are an outcome of existing local institutions, the article challenges the Chinese political 
economy literature that posits the ‘Chinese model’ as warranted when production is globally 
organised.  
 






One of the intriguing debates in current political economy is about the role of “Chinese model” 
in enriching perspectives of global governance, hegemonic power, capital accumulation 
strategies and international division of labor (Chin, Pearson and Yong, 2013; Hung, 2008). The 
Chinese political economy literature highlights a unique role of the Chinese state under the 
initiative of “One Belt One Road” in absorbing crisis of global capital accumulation (Ferchen, 
2013; Zhongying and Wang, 2013). Our study diverges from the extant literature in two ways: in 
contrast to the macro analysis of global economic governance, we examine Foxconn’s 
production regimes so as to zoom into the interplay between the macro structure and localized 
process. Secondly, by paying attention both to the political economy and localized configuration, 
and hence to how Foxconn as a giant transnational corporation operates in China and elsewhere 
(see also Fasenfest, 2018), we move  beyond the viewpoint that China’s model of economic 
development is unique or specific to China. We ask: by comparing China and the Czech 
Republic, a post-socialist country, through the lens of Foxconn production, what commonalities 
and differences can we observe in relation to their development paths?  
Global capital accumulation and transnational production highlight a shifting paradigm in 
understanding contemporary production regimes, which requires a new theorization to 
conceptualize the multiple scale of capital accumulation linking up multi-site production regimes 
in the world (Cartier, 2018; Gonzalez-Vicente, 2017). Economic globalization has commonly 
been regarded as a process of homogenization that begins in established industrial regions of the 
global North and extends to peripheral areas in the global South (Dicken 2015; Ohmae, 1994). In 
the studies undertaken by labor advocates, practitioners and NGOs, it is multinational 
corporations that are seen as driving down factory labor conditions (Pun, Tse and Ng, 2018). 
China, and in particular the label ‘Made in China’, have become synonymous with low wages, 
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excessive overtime, and exploitative working conditions (Pun 2016). One of the most prominent 
examples of this trend is Foxconn, a Taiwanese-owned largest electronic manufacturer in the 
world. Its Chinese factories assembling iPhones for Apple, have come into spotlight for 
excessive overtime work, unhealthy and unsafe working conditions, use of student-labor, 
militarised disciplinary regime, and workers’ suicides (Pun and Chan, 2012; Pun et al., 2014). 
The arrival of Chinese multinational companies to Europe has raised fears that these firms are ‘a 
beachhead from which China will spread its own labor model into Europe’ (Meunier, 2012: 8), a 
model aimed at undoing full employment, driving down wages and weakening the trade unions.  
Contrasting of working conditions in China to those in Europe establishes two distinct 
parts of the world, imagined as divided and opposite in their managerial practices and treatment 
of the workforce. We suggest that such a way of framing of contemporary labor regimes is 
highly problematic. Firstly, it tends to highlight a unique “Chinese model” in the process of 
capitalist development; secondly, it simplifies the power relations and actors involved in forming 
of those labor regimes; and thirdly, it hides the extent to which the state and trade unions are, in 
both locations, partaking in this process. An analysis that proceeds by established oppositional 
topographies fails to capture the complexity of processes that permit capital’s expansion and 
accumulation globally and veils the common characteristics of capital and related labor regimes 
in Europe and China. So far, scholars working within the tradition of international division of 
labor have provided important insights on the power relations that accompany the relocation of 
production from the North to the South (Elson and Pearson, 1981; Mezzadri, 2017; Salzinger, 
2003). A notable exception is the study of Japan’s lean production model of automotive industry 
which transplanted from Japan to the North America in the 1980s (Milkman, 1992). We propose 
to examine the opposite movement of capital, namely that from Asia to Europe. Such a shift 
makes visible the extent to which capitalist development is contingent upon capital-labor 
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relations and the ways in which a close investigation of these relations reveals common aspects 
of global capitalism (Smith, 2017).  
In order to articulate this shifting paradigm, we draw on Mezzadra and Neilson’s  (2013) 
concept of ‘multiplication of labor’. ‘Multiplication of labor’ illustrates modalities through which 
capital is expanding and the ways in which the politics of labor is shifting. It offers an alternative 
perspective to that of the international division of labor that sees the world divided into the 
Northern ‘core’ capitalist nations and peripheral Southern regions where cheap labor is located 
and put to work. In working with the notion of multiplication of labor, our aim is to show the 
limitations of a conceptualisation of global north/south division of labour, and the related 
hierarchies of work conditions and differences in unionisation. Instead we aim to illustrate the 
parallels in labour conditions in global south and global north and hence show commonalities of 
contemporary global capitalism while at the same time paying attention to the specificity of local 
labor regimes. Mezzadra and Neilson identify three key dimensions to multiplication of labor. 
Diversification to indicate the expansion of capital and creation of new kinds of production; 
heterogenisation to illustrate the varied workforce as well as legal and social regimes that 
organise labor; and intensification to refer to the ways in which non-work sphere is increasingly 
colonised by capital. We address these processes in our discussion of migration and 
segmentation of the workforce, the role if state in backing capital expansion, and use of 
dormitory labor regimes in China and Czech Republic respectively.  
 
Research Methods 
Foxconn currently has more than 200 subsidiaries around the world. Due to severe competitions 
in securing the orders from its main customers such as Apple and HP, working outside of China 
enables Foxconn’s customers to be located closer to their end markets, get quicker turnaround on 
orders, reduce transportation costs and avoid import taxes. This article draws on the original 
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ethnographic fieldwork conducted in China and the Czech Republic between 2010 and 2016. In 
China, research began in 2010 with interviews of workers, student interns and managers in nine 
cities mainly in coastal China where Foxconn factories are concentrated: Shenzhen, Shanghai, 
Kunshan, Hangzhou, Nanjing, Tianjin, Langfang, Taiyuan and Wuhan. Further investigation was 
conducted in three Foxconn plants in the central and southwestern provinces into which Foxconn 
was expanding in the search for new sources of low cost labor following government’s Go West 
initiative: Chongqing, Chengdu and Zhengzhou. The data on Foxconn in China consists of 2400 
questionnaires and more than 500 interviews with former and current Foxconn’s workers, 
student-laborers and managers gathered by the University Research Group on Foxconn and the 
Hong Kong-based labor campaign group SACOM (Students and Scholars against Corporate 
Misbehaviour). The survey findings and interviews provided the basic composition of the 
workers, management practices, workplace conditions and trade union practices.  
Czech Republic is Foxconn’s manufacturing headquarters for the EMEA (Europe, the 
Middle East and Africa) region. Acquired in 2000, Czech subsidiary is Foxconn’s first and most 
important European plant and its main client is Hewlett-Packard (HP). We began research in the 
Czech Republic in 2012 by interviewing former and current Foxconn’s blue- and white-collar 
workers and managers, as well as key informants in public institutions such as ministries of labor, 
trade unions, labor inspectorates, and local job centres. A total of 70 in-depth interviews supplied 
information about the firm’s work and employment practices, the social composition of the 
workforce and workers’ labor mobility, and the impact of trade unions. It is worth noting that the 
research in the Czech Republic is part of a larger study on Foxconn’s operations in Europe 
(Turkey, Slovakia and Hungary). The combined insights into workers’ experiences, modes of 
management and the role of the institutions provides a picture of similarities and differences of 




Capital meets State  
The rapid expansion of transnational capital took place on a global scale in the context of the 
failure of communist regimes and the U-turn to a neo-liberal world in the 1980s. Foxconn, as the 
largest electronic manufacturer in the world, has undergone this historical transformation and is 
able to create multiple scale of capital accumulation linking up multi-site production regimes in 
different parts of the world. Foxconn’s expansion was enabled, as we illustrate in this section, by 
various forms of state support.  
Foxconn is the trade name of Hon Hai Precision Industry Company which set up in 
Taiwan in February 1974. The name Foxconn alludes to the corporation’s ability to produce 
electronics products at ‘fox-like’ speed in order to increase its productivity and  the surplus of 
value. Foxconn tapped in the reform period into mainland China’s preferential policies on 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in special economic zones, especially Shenzhen.   In 1980, 
Shenzhen became the engine of China’s export economy and the first special economic zone 
opened to overseas Chinese and foreign investments. Here in 1988 Foxconn located its first 
processing plant Haiyang (“The Ocean”). It began with a workforce of 150 migrants from rural 
Guangdong, including 100 young women workers. The Chinese state facilitated Foxconn’s 
expansion from Shenzhen to western China where the cost of labor is between a quarter and a 
third lower than in Shenzhen and the Yangzi River Delta. This is the case for Chongqing where 
Foxconn erected a sole base for assembling HP products.  Chongqing government built a factory 
compound and workers’ dormitories in order to subsidize Foxconn investment. In order to 
facilitate and direct the expansion of capital, the state controls the level of legal minimum wage 
and its differential distribution across China’s various provinces. Today, Foxconn runs 32 
assembly plants  in China and commands a workforce of over 1 million, mostly rural migrants 
(Pun and Chan, 2012).  
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Foxconn’s expansion in mainland China is the actual realization of the multiple scale of  
global production regimes by which  lead brands are able to outsource manufacturing of their 
products to contract manufacturers, commonly located in low-cost Asian countries. Through 
mergers and concentration of production, Foxconn was able to eliminate waste associated with 
storage of excessive stock and establish a demand-responsive, just-in-time production for export. 
Expanding within China does not fit the company’s global strategy to meet quick demand for 
products from lead brands. As part of its geographical diversification, in 2000 Foxconn set up a 
number of plants in Eastern Europe in order to shorten its supply chain and be closer to its 
Western European consumers.  
Actively negotiating with the local institutions in the Czech Republic, Foxconn acquired 
two factories, an old-field in Pardubice in 2000 and a greenfield in Kutna Hora in 2007. Taking 
advantage of regional competitive advantage factors such as low labor costs, skilled labor, 
proximity to the Western European market and the pre-existing infrastructure (Bormann and 
Plank 2010; Radosevic, 2004), Foxconn was able to avoid the European Union’s (EU) high tariff 
barriers, as for example the 14 per cent import duty on LCD TVs  and to label their products as 
‘Made in the EU’. Both the national and local Czech governments offered incentives to Foxconn. 
The national government granted Foxconn €58 million in state aid from 2007 to 2013 (Čaněk, 
2016: 98), and a 10-year tax break from 2000 to 2010 (Evertiq, 2007). CzechInvest, the 
investment and business development agency of the Czech’s Ministry of Industry and Trade, 
assisted Foxconn’s managing director Jim Chang to find the most suitable location for the set-up 
of the manufacturing plant. 
In the Czech Republic, like in China, Foxconn’s expansion is backed by what 
Drahokoupil (2008) calls ‘investment-promotion machines’, namely neo-liberal pro-growth 
coalitions composed of national, regional and local state actors (Drahokoupil, 2008: 206). In 
short, the focus on state-capital alliance shows the process of diversification intended as 
 
 8 
expansion of capital and creation of new production sites. The support of the state that Foxconn 
received at the national level and its tapping into internal competition at the local level, enabled 
Foxconn to diversify. Its expansion is largely supported and facilitated by the state in term of tax-
free policies, provision of land and infrastructure, and lowering production costs. Foxconn’s 
organisation and optimisation of production among different zones and regions is, we suggest, its 
key competitive advantage.  
 
Flexible Labor Use: Recruitment and Migration  
One of the striking commonalities between Foxconn factories in the Czech Republic and China 
is the flexible use of labor. Suppressing labor costs and speeding up production for a just-in-time 
consumer market are the requirements of Foxconn’s survival and expansion strategies in global 
capital accumulation regardless where it locates its production facilities. Despite the fact that the 
scale of labor use is much smaller in the Czech Republic than in China, the majority of flexible 
labor use in both locations is dependent on either internal or external migrant workers. In this 
section we focus on ‘heterogenisation’ to illustrate the growing heterogeneity of the workforce as 
well as of the legal and social regimes that organise labor.  
While initially composed solely of directly employed Czech workers, over time 
Foxconn’s workforce in the Czech Republic diversified considerably. There are several reasons 
for this. Firstly, from the outset Foxconn experienced difficulty to recruit and retain local 
workers. This is due to the nature of assembly line production, as well as the irregularity of 
shifts, compulsory overtime, low wages and weak trade union representation.  Shortage of local 
workers forced Foxconn to recruit workers abroad via Temporary Working Agencies (TWAs). 
This resulted in a set up workforce is composed 60 per cent of directly employed and 40 per cent 
of agency workers. Secondly, following EU integration, workers from Eastern Europe have been 
enjoying the right to move and take up work anywhere in the EU. Workers’ previous experiences 
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of EU-wide labour migration, knowledge of the EU labour market and social networks led them 
to view their job at Foxconn as temporary (Andrijasevic and Sacchetto, 2016a). In that workers 
would leave as soon as a better opportunity presented itself elsewhere in the EU, Foxconn 
continuously needed to look for new pools of labour. By using TWAs, Foxconn was able to first 
recruit young workers from Slovakia and Poland and later workers well into their 50s and 60s 
from Romania and Bulgaria. Thirdly, Foxconn segmented its workforce to reduce the labour 
costs and contractual responsibilities of direct employment, respond to the high seasonal 
fluctuation of orders and lessen the polarisation of profit between brand names and assemblers. 
The vertical disintegration between brand names and assemblers results in low margins with 
intense pressure on costs, especially labour costs, for contract manufacturers.  
 Workforce segmentation is hierarchically organised based on nationality. At the top there 
are British senior managers and Czech middle managers. Czechs and a small number of Slovaks 
core workers occupy the best positions as foreman, supervisor and group leaders while agency 
workers work on assembly lines in unqualified tasks.  There is also a small group of non-EU 
nationals who are core workers (Mongolians, Ukrainians and Vietnamese) who work in assembly 
line as repair, computer technicians or foremen. To summarize, in the Check Republic the 
organization of the workforce is heterogeneous but hierarchical which in turn results in 
differentiated level of hourly pay and working and living conditions. It is also worth noting that 
using agencies to recruit foreign workers on short-term contracts is alien to Foxconn in China 
which, as we see below, deploys student interns to the same end. 
By comparison, Foxconn in mainland China relies entirely on the use of young rural 
migrant workforce originating from all over China. In time of labor shortage, posters and fliers 
are placed on lamp posts, footbridges and display boards around the factory areas to entice 
people to work at Foxconn. Males or females, aged 16 or above, who have completed middle 
school or vocational training schools, and in good physical and mental health conditions, are 
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eligible to apply. With the loosening control over hukou (household registration system) and 
labor mobility since 1980s, the migrant laborers were able to move either within their own 
province, or outside their own region. Foxconn recruits mostly these migrant youths, 16 and 29 
years old, to run the assembly lines. These are the workers who, since the 1980s, have replaced 
the old urban-based state sector workers as the core of the new Chinese working class (Pun, 
2016). The high proportion of circa 85 per cent of young frontline workers has enabled Foxconn 
to command great physical dexterity, super speed, and long working hours in its factories. It also 
enabled Foxconn to expand the size of its factories  through the promise of better life for this 
rural youth. For example, the plant in Chongqing expanded from 30,000 employees in 2013 to 
60,000 in 2017. In an employee orientation talk in Chongqing and Chengdu, the Foxconn 
instructor said: “Hurry toward your finest dreams, pursue a magnificent life. At Foxconn, you 
can expand your knowledge and accumulate experience”.   
Unlike the agency practice in the Czech Republic, in China all staff and frontline workers 
are directly employed by Foxconn, apart from student interns. The use of students from 
vocational schools, who make up 15 per cent of the total workforce during peak production 
months in certain plants, assures flexibility and cuts costs. Students’ work is considered 
internship, so they are paid less than the minimum wage and are not protected by labour laws 
(Smith and Chan, 2015). Except student interns, all migrant workers signed labor contracts 
directly with Foxconn, usually for one to three years, though in different subsidiaries or branches. 
Local governments provided various administrative and financial supports in recruiting laborers, 
either through providing assistance via labour bureaus to recruit workers or by facilitating 
vocational collages to send in student interns to work for Foxconn. In the Czech Republic, the 
support from the local government is not as comprehensive or institutionalised as in China. 
Governmental regulations do however shape and promote the existing labor regime at Foxconn 
plants. For example, since 2012 Czech government barred TWAs from hiring non-EU workers. 
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This made employing non-EU nationals more difficult and created an increased administrative 
burden for employers as not non-EU nationals must be hired directly by employers. This has 
significantly reduced the number of directly employed Mongolian and Vietnamese workers at 
Foxconn and increased the number of temporary EU agency workers. The Czech state supports 
the TWAs and hence the segmentation of labor through its lax requirements that make it 
relatively easy to set up a TWA. According to the representative of the Ministry of Labor, one 
needs to be at least 23 years old, without a criminal record, have three or five years of working 
experience and obtain a permit issued by the Ministry. There is no need for an initial capital 
investment, only the payment of a 50,000 CZK administrative fee (€2000).  
The picture that emerges from this analysis of Foxconn plants in the Czech Republic and 
China is that of a highly differentiated and hierarchically organized workforce whose flexibility 
is driven by the needs of the production process and facilitated by the neo-liberal state policies. 
In both China and the Czech Republic, the recruitment system that relies heavily on migrant 
workers permitted Foxconn to get access to just-in-time workers needed for its fluctuating 
production. The mobility patterns of labour are in both locations strongly influenced by the local 
institutions (Cheng et al., 2014). Hence, while using agencies to recruit workers on short-term 
contracts is alien to Foxconn in China, the latter deploys student interns to the same end of 
lowering labour costs and achieving flexible labour use. 
 
Workplace Culture and Labor Process  
The speed of Foxconn’s expansion in China and around the globe is extraordinary and it creates 
a corporate mythology. On entering the gate of Foxconn, Chinese workers immediately 
understand that they are part of CEO Terry Gou’s industrial army. Gou has a collection of 
quotations on the work philosophy that managers and workers are required to learn: 
Successful people find a way, unsuccessful people find excuses. 
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Growth thy name is suffering. 
A harsh environment is a good thing.  
Obey, obey, and absolutely obey!  
Execution is the integration of speed, accuracy and precision. 
When Foxconn management attempted to plant the seeds of corporate mythology in the Czech 
factory, they were not successful because of the social and cultural context that sets the limits to 
which this work philosophy can be implemented. A retired female worker from the Czech 
factory puts it like this:  
 
“In Shenzhen in China the practice is different. Foxconn tried to set up something similar 
here. Managers are expecting us to be grateful for what we have and to give up our lives 
for them. But here it just does not work like that.”  
 
While the global network of plants enables Foxconn to simplify and optimize production and 
continuously balance inventories with demand, the management needs to deal both with the 
specificity of cultural, legal and institutional arrangements in each location and the specificity 
and diversity of labor. 
In Chongqing, Foxconn management organizes labor processes through a centralized 
hierarchical system in which production lines are administered by departments directly 
responsible to their business units, business divisions, and ultimately business groups. The 13-
level Foxconn management hierarchy is organized in a pyramid with clear lines of command. 
Senior leaders, all of them from Taiwan formulate the corporate development strategy and set 
annual revenue and profit goals. Middle management compromised of university graduates and 
most of them urban, devises implementation plans and delegates responsibility. Production 
workers, the majority of who are rural migrants in combination with a small proportion of urban 
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lower classes, are subjected to supervision to complete the assigned work. Within the workshop, 
production operators and student interns face multiple layers of management from assistant line 
leaders, line leaders, team leaders and supervisors.  
While Foxconn in the Czech Republic follows the similar structure as in China, albeit 
with fewer and less strict levels of hierarchy, its mode of management is much more complicated 
and diversified. Similar to its Chinese counterparts, the workforce operates in departments (i.e. 
units) rigidly divided by brand (i.e. customer). Unlike Foxconn in China, due to the multiplicity 
of nationalities and languages spoken by the workers, Foxconn in the Czech Republic  is 
dependent on a relative decentralizing way of management. .Consequently, it relies on more 
diversified sources of power and control over labor. Directly employed workers (mostly Czechs 
and a manful of Slovaks, Mongolians, and Vietnamese) and agency workers (Slovaks, Poles, 
Romanian and Bulgarians) do not share the same employer. Hence they have different wages, 
rights and benefits. For core workers monthly wage is circa € 600-700 and for agency workers  
about € 480-550 per month. Compared to the net wage average in the Czech Republic in 2017 of 
€ 950-1010 and the minimum wage of €423 (Czech Statistical Office, 2017; Mysíková, 2012), 
Foxconn workers earn less than the nationwide average but significantly above the minimum 
wage.  
Core and agency workers follow different working shifts. Core workers work three 12-
hour shifts, both day and night, per week. They are managed through an ‘hour-bank’ system 
established by collective agreement, which required workers to work a total of 930 hours over 
six months. The hour-bank system is used to organise shifts, and has both a regulatory function 
with regard to the workforce (workers are rotated on the basis of the number of hours they 
worked) and a cost reduction function, as all hours are paid at the same flat rate (Andrijasevic 
and Sacchetto, 2017). Agency workers are on an initial contract of 300 hours during which 
workers were not paid full wages but were given an advance of 1 000 Kč (€40) per week. They 
 
 14 
also work 12-hour day and night shifts but their shifts are highly irregular: during peak season 
they might work five or more shifts a week, while during low season they might have two shifts 
a week and work less than 12 hours per shift. Despite the pressure this system puts on the 
workers, migrants commonly complain about not working enough as their shifts are intermittent 
and characterized by long rest periods. 
As workers rarely share the same language, it is technology that facilitates the 
cooperation among workers on the assembly line. Instructions on how to perform various tasks 
are displayed on the monitors above the various positions – in this way workers without 
knowledge of Czech language can perform their tasks and maintain the performance targets. If a 
worker makes a mistake, it is detected quickly through the integrated CCTV circuit. Pressure, 
fines and segmentation are reasons for the mistrust and lack of communication between the 
workers. Language barriers contribute strongly to this division, amplify the boredom of 
operations, and produce a feeling of isolation among workers. Yet, while differed in mode of 
management, workers at both Czech and Chinese plants experienced the same intensity of 
control over work speed: “Every day I’m hurried along faster and faster, rushing towards each 
and every rising quota. There’s nowhere for my mind to rest. Every month I’ve to shift my work 
from day to night, and vice versa. This is a tough working life,” commented a Chongqing worker.  
In Foxconn in China, management and control over workers are more unified and 
straightforward (Feng, 2017). When a worker is recruited, a normal package of training including 
military drill, corporate ethos, personal behavior and safety will be provided. Every employee is 
given the Foxconn’s Employee Handbook that lists more than one hundred regulations and fines. 
Any behavior that violates production discipline is subjected to penalties. Punishments include 
warnings, demerits and dismissal. A line leader explained that every worker must present a good, 
clean and well-disciplined image to company clients: “No sleeping, no conversing, no laughing” 
is the number one factory rule.  
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A normal work shift is 10 hours, from 8am to 6pm for day shift, and from 8pm to 6am for 
night shift. During busy seasons, a working day lasts 12 hours, which includes four hours of 
imposed overtime. Foxconn adopts a so-called ‘rationalization’ policy of work time and pay. It 
signed an agreement with workers calling for voluntary overtime to allow the company to 
coordinate overtime. Foxconn defends its policy of overtime work as ‘voluntary’: according to 
the management, either an employee chooses to work overtime or not. Workers always consent 
to do ‘some’ overtime work, keenly aware that their basic incomes “are very low; hardly enough 
for personal use,” an interviewed worker said. After the suicides, the production workers in 
Chongqing and elsewhere had a substantial wage and earned between 2500 RMB (€308) and 
3000 RMB (€370) per month, which is above the minimum wage (€235 or 1800 RMB in 2017). 
As wages are linked to the region, in Shenzhen wages can be up to €500, almost equal to agency 
workers’ wage in the Czech Republic. For low to mid-ranged manager or a technician, the month 
payment was between 4000 Yuan (€493) and 5000 Yuan (€617) per month. These workers were 
aware that their wage increase was a result of workers’ ‘jumping’ (i.e. committing suicide): “No 
jump, no pay increase”, said a frontline worker in Foxconn. 
As we can se from the comparison of work regime in Foxconn plants in China and the 
Czech Republic [insert Table 1], diversification of production requires management to also 
diversify its labor regime. Hence, depending on the composition of the workforce and the local 
institutional setting, Foxconn adopted more unified management practices in China in contrast to 
differentiated labor management strategies in the Czech Republic. In the latter location the firm 
diversified its management practices in order to front the heterogeneity of the workforce and 
simultaneously guarantee flexibility. 
. 
Organization of Reproduction: Dormitory Labor 
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The dormitory labor regime is typical of Foxconn production facilities in both countries. While 
the aim of dormitories is to compress the workplace and living space, facilitate just-in-time 
production and extend management’s control over labour outside the workplace, dormitories in 
China and the Czech Republic differ in form, size and scale. Since its first set-up in China in 
1988, Foxconn has housed the majority of its workforce in collective dormitories. In China 
dormitories are part of a larger complex that incorporates the factory, the dormitories, and a 
number of basic facilities such as beauty-parlours, eateries, and internet shops. The arrangement 
of factories and dormitories on the same campus allows the fast and flexible organization of 
production as well as compulsory overtime, as workers are always within management’s reach. 
Dormitories are used as accommodation for both workers and managers. Managers are provided 
with different types of accommodation from workers depending on their seniority level. Mid 
ranged managers are most likely to share an apartment between two and four persons, while the 
production workers share between six to twelve persons. From workers’ perspective, dormitories 
provide inexpensive housing close to their employment as they only pay 110 Yuan (€18) each 
month.  
Dormitories are often overcrowded and living conditions are poor. In Chongqing,  the 
local government provided Foxconn with several 18-story dormitory buildings which got filled 
with bunk beds, accommodating as many as a hundred people in a single floor. “The toilets and 
shower rooms were a big mess,” a worker recalled. Night-shift workers sleep during the day, 
while day-shift workers are at work. Group fighting, thefts, and other personal security problems 
arose in this pressure-cooker atmosphere. Security officers monitor the dormitory gate around the 
clock and if needed they inspect each and every floor. Male and female workers are forbidden 
from visiting each another’s rooms. The concept of Foxconn is that of total control – not only are 
workers barred from cooking in the name of fire safety, but they also are not allowed to wash 
clothes as this get done through the centralised factory cleaning service to save water and 
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energy.. Managers stress the importance of maintaining discipline in order to guarantee 
productivity. As a dormitory facility manager said, “We need to protect the workers, especially 
women workers from hanging out and make sure they return to their dorm rooms before mid-
night.” This manager further emphasized that workers living in the over-crowded dorms should 
learn how to get along with each other as this is part of collective life inside Foxconn. In the 
dormitories, discipline, cooperation and obedience were the rule that without exception governed 
workers lives. 
Housing arrangements in the Czech Republic are again more complicated and diversified. 
Czech workers are local residents and live in houses and flats in villages or cities close to the 
factories.  Migrant workers, on the other hand, are housed in different dormitories based on their 
nationality and the TWA they work for. As early as 2001, Foxconn tried to build its own 
dormitories but gave up because of local opposition. The solution was to pass the responsibility 
for the dormitories onto the TWAs, which arranged the hire of individual hotels, army barracks 
or former factory lodgings to house the workers. There are several dormitories in Pardubice, 
none of them within the walking distance from the factory. The management system of 
dormitories is relatively standardized.  
Allocation of workers in the dormitory and their distribution into rooms is managed by 
the TWAs. Agencies pay up to Kč 3000 (€150) for accommodation per worker per month in the 
dormitories. Four workers per room is standard, but the availability of en suite bathroom and 
kitchenette differs radically from dormitory to dormitory. Unlike in China, living spaces are 
shared between men and women and in some dormitories there are no separate showers and 
toilets for men and women who, all 70 of them per one floor, use the same limited facilities. 
Control over workers lies with agencies and private labour supply firms. While less obsessive 
than in China, it is continuous, and aims to suppress behaviours that the firm considers dangerous 
(such as smoking in the rooms), or that can decrease productivity (such as excessive drinking) or 
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camaraderie (hosting friends). The problems that coordinators deal mostly with are conflicts 
between workers of different nationalities, especially regarding alcohol – which is not tolerated 
but it widely consumed– and prostitution occasionally.  
Foxconn’s labour regime hinges on the use of collective workers dormitories. By 
studying the dormitory labor in both countries, we note capital’s similar tendency to colonize the 
entire life of laboring subjects. As no children are permitted in the dormitories and thus no 
disruptions caused by schooling or parenting needs, the dormitories place workers outside the 
regular cycles of the reproductive sphere and orientate all activities towards meeting production 
needs. The dormitory labor regime, previously assumed to be a unique feature of Foxconn’s 
Chinese factories (Pun and Smith, 2007), is also an essential element of firm’s workforce 
management practices at its other plants. Dormitory labour regime, we suggest, is to be read as a 
trans-local spatial “fix” that is enabling capital to reorganise and expand. Dormitories are an 
efficient spatial strategy that has transformed socialist China into the ‘workshop of the world’ 
and is expediting the Czech Republic’s integration into global production circuits. As such, 
dormitory labor regime is an example of the importation of a labor model from China into the 
Czech Republic. However, it is important to note that this is not a model that is implemented in 
all Foxconn’s overseas subsidiaries (see for e.g. in Turkey) but only in those that deploy large 
numbers of migrant workers (Andrijasevic and Sacchetto, 2016). Management practices that a 
firm adopts in it subsidiaries are not uniform or just management-driven but contingent on the 
composition of the workforce.  
Finally, while capital might appear to have an all-encompassing control over migrant 
labor, the paradox is that dormitories are places of socialization and exchange of information 
between workers about working conditions and wages elsewhere. In the Czech Republic case, 
many migrants previously worked in another EU country and, by relying on the TWAs and 
dormitories they move and find work relatively easily. In China, dormitories are pivotal for 
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building of potential worker unity and resistance. Dormitory labor arrangement have 
considerably contributed to the transformed industrial urban space facilitated the formation of the 
new working class and its organized struggles in China.  
 
The Power of Labor 
In this final section we discuss the power of labor and we address trade unions, organized 
protests as well as individual forms of exit. We see that in China there is a "strong state" but 
more labor resistance, while in Czech Republic there is a relatively "weak state" and the presence 
of a democratic labor union and yet less labor actions and protest. We explain this paradox by 
highlighting different forms of capital-labor relations.  
The similarity between Foxconn’s plants in China and the Czech Republic is weak trade 
unions. In China this is due to the fact that the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) 
was marginalized in the course of market reforms. The ACFTU lost about 17 million members 
between 1997 and 2000, a time when numerous state workers were laid-off and large numbers of 
small and medium state-owned enterprises got privatized, restructured or bankrupted (Traub-
Merz, 2012). The Chinese state and the union bureaucracy then targeted large foreign-invested 
enterprises to unionize. Consequently unions got set up in 92 per cent of Fortune 500 companies 
operating in China, including Foxconn (Liu, 2011). By 2017, ACFTU had a total membership of 
302 million of who 46 per cent (i.e. 139 million) were rural migrant workers. 3  The total 
membership numbers in China surpass the International Trade Union Confederation global 
membership of 176 million workers in 156 countries and territories excluding China.4 Despite 
the robust Chinese union membership statistics, what these fail to reveal is that China’s 
enterprise unions are, as Anita Chan put it “an integral part of factory management” (2011: 42). 
In fact, workers do not enjoy freedom of association and there is no right to strike. An occurring 
                                                        
3 See http://acftu.people.com.cn/n1/2017/0410/c197470-29200210.html  
4 International Trade Union Confederation. 2013. “Address Book.” http://www.ituc-csi.org/?page=abook  
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phenomena in China, perhaps best exemplified by the strikes at Honda’s Nanhai plant in 2010, is 
the breaking away of workers from the state affiliated union and the formation of a more 
autonomous base of workers’ power (Friedman, 2014; Hui and Chan, 2015). 
When it comes to the Czech Republic, de-unionisation across Central and Eastern Europe is to be 
viewed in the context of the transition from state socialism to market economy, EU integration 
and large FDIs that heavily shaped institutional transformation (Bandelj 2008; Meardi, 2007). 
Post 1989, the Czech Republic experienced a decrease of union membership and lessening of 
collective bargaining coverage. The main trade union authority is the Czech-Moravian 
Confederation of Trade Unions (ČMKOS) and its mode of operating is a quite unchanged ‘old 
style’ based on the experience of state socialism (Myant, 2010). Since the 1990s, ČMKOS’ union 
membership dropped dramatically and today is about  10 per cent, the number that includes also 
inactive members such as pensioners. As part of EU integration, the Czech Republic deregulated 
its labor legislation with consequent worsening of social standards (Meardi, 2007). One of these 
standards is, as the representative of ČMKOS explained, the pressure on the Czech Republic to 
uniform its maximum working week (48 hours) to that of other Western European countries (56 
hours). Unions are involved at national level and have to be consulted on minimum wage, bonus 
wage and on working conditions. Collective bargain is mainly at firm-level, while government 
set the minimum wage every year. Due to the decentralised bargaining system and union’s 
integration in the social dialogue structure at the national level, local company-based union 
branches are rather acquiescent and in some cases rather close to management’s interests (Myant, 
2010; Bormann and Plank, 2010).  
The commonality of interests between management and union, in the case of Foxconn in 
China, severely undermines the capacity of enterprise union to represent the workers (Pringle, 
2011). Firstly, like many other foreign-invested enterprises Foxconn  evaded its basic 
responsibilities under Chinese law to set up a trade union and did so only in 2006 when a British 
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newspaper exposed ‘iPod sweatshop’ conditions at its Longhua factory in Shenzhen.5 However, 
even after setting it up, any independence on the union from the management was undermined by 
the fact that the union has been chaired by Foxconn CEO Terry Gou’s special personal assistant, 
Chen Peng. Secondly, Foxconn union organization mirrors the company hierarchy from the 
assembly lines, business units, and business groups, to the corporate administrative level. 
Workers repeatedly told us that the human resources department is the trade union. Their 
response conveyed a profound truth about the subordination of the union to the company. Li 
Xiaoxiang a 17-year-old worker said, “The union often organizes day trips, hiking, fishing, 
singing, dancing, basketball tournaments, and partner matching parties on Valentine’s Day. 
These could help workers relax to some extent. However, we’re exhausted from work.” He 
added, “I’d say the union doesn’t act according to workers’ needs; rather the activities are based 
on company needs.” Most workers perceive the union as either ‘untrustworthy’ or ‘useless’ when 
it comes to negotiations over wages and benefits, work-injury compensation, employment 
contract terms and labor dispute settlements. If workers are in distress, they seek assistance from 
their own friends and families, non-governmental labor rights groups and other supporters.  
In the Czech Republic, while the trade unions especially in the electronics sector are 
weak, they are not one and the same with the management. When Foxconn got established in the 
Czech Republic, it did so by acquiring of the Tesla Group, a former socialist conglomerate. 
Consequently, Foxconn inherited the former Tesla trade union, part of the Metalworkers Union 
(KOVO).  Despite early substitution strategy when management tried to replace the union with 
the human resources department, the union managed to survive. Yet, union stewards are not 
allowed to actively recruit new members within the plant: they are prohibited from walking 
around the factory hall and telling others about the work of the trade union. Management 
weakened the union also through its strategy to deploy agency workers. Not only are agency 
                                                        
5 Reporters without Borders. 4 September 2006. “Foxconn Drops Lawsuit Against Two China Business News 
Journalists.” http://en.rsf.org/china-foxconn-drops-lawsuit-against-two-04-09-2006,18691.html  
 
 22 
workers not able to join the trade union but the segmentation of workforce into directly 
employed and agency workers is creating tensions and mistrust among workers. At the same 
time, the union is not much interested in the EU migrant workers, largely because they do not 
speak Czech and their turnover is rather high. Consequently, the overwhelming majority of 
union’s 300 members are core Czech workers.  
Segmentation of the labor market creates tensions within the workplace that are amplified 
by management’s hierarchical allocation of tasks on the basis of nationality.  This in turn 
prevents workers from finding significant convergences of struggle. When protests and/or 
disruptions occur, and this is still rare, these remain separated along lines of nationality such as 
the refusal to meet the set targets by the Vietnamese workers or a protest at the Kutna Hora plant 
by Czech core workers over unpaid yearly bonuses. With punitive management, weak and 
disinterested unions, foreign and agency workers are left to react to exploitative working 
situation through individual ‘exit’. As a large part of the workers had previous working 
experience abroad, at times in several countries, they are able to compare wages, hourly 
standards and quotas of production. Workers see these different experiences in terms of one job 
at the time and as isolated opportunities in various countries that are as yet to generate strong 
collective bonds between workers (Andrijasevic and Sacchetto, 2016b).  
In China the situation is different and marked by various autonomous workers protests 
demanding labor rights, protections, benefits and their share of the value their create. With 
companies like Foxconn building subsidiaries and relocating production from coastal to interior 
regions, new worker grievances are growing in these locations and valuable activist experiences 
are disseminated from one workplace to another. Migrant labor protests are no longer confined to 
southern coastal China as in the early years of reform. The tightly integrated global production 
regime has provided workers with an opportunity to demonstrate their collective strength. Their 
actions take multiple forms including slowdown, industrial sabotage, group fighting, mass 
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suicide threats, road blockages, strikes and riots, to name a few forms of protests (Pun, 2016). 
From the sunbelt Pearl River region in Guangdong to fast-expanding manufacturing centers in 
Chongqing, Chengdu, Taiyuan, Zhengzhou and Wuhan, Foxconn workers have been engaging in 
workplace conflict and collective action.  
 
Conclusion 
This article uses Foxconn as the case study to examine the multiple scales of global capital 
accumulation and its concrete configuration of production at specific spatial fix, which is 
enabling capital to reorganise and expand. We show that, contrary to expectations that labor 
conditions and work regimes would diverge based on the factories’ respective placement in the 
global South and the global North, there are remarkable parallels in labour conditions and 
management practices. In comparing Foxconn production regimes in China and the Czech 
Republic, we identify a specific set of interventions on the part of the firm that have enabled its 
global organisation of production. We additionally identify which practices Foxconn imported 
from China and which are an outcome of existing local institutions. In doing so we illustrate the 
role of the state and the trade union in enabling firm’s expansion and in upholding exploitative 
work regimes.  
In making visible the political economic and labour regimes commonalities in China and 
the Czech Republic, this article challenges the Chinese political economy literature that posits 
the ‘Chinese model’ as warranted for globally organised production. The article also makes a 
critical contribution to the literature on labor and global political economy by problematizing the 
North-South divide, in particular with respect to class formation and labor agency. In showing 
the ways in which firms actively adjusts they work regimes to respond to the heterogeneity of 
labour relation and to the non-institutionalised forms of workers agency, we posit migrant labour 
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